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I. INTRODUCTION
The second amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall
not be infringed."' Although this language appears to grant a broad
right to keep and bear arms, the Supreme Court has not applied
the second amendment to the states. Instead, the second amendment
restrains national government infringement of the general right of
the people to keep and bear the arms necessary for a well regulated
militia.2 The failure of the Supreme Court to apply the second
amendment to them has effectively given the states an unrestrained
power to regulate the keeping and bearing of arms by individuals.
In light of such broad powers in the states, there has been a growing
concern over the lack of protection for this individual right.3 For
the protection of the right from state infringement, an overwhelming
1. U.S. CONST., amend. II (emphasis added).
2. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886);
and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
3. Dowlut & Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 OKLA. CITY
U.L. REv. 177 (1982).
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majority of states4 have adopted constitutional provisions securing
the right to keep and bear arms.5
West Virginians recognized the lack of protection from state in-
fringement and recently adopted a constitutional provision protect-
ing the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family,
home and state.6 Commonly known as the "Right to Keep and Bear
Arms Amendment," article III, section 22 of the West Virginia Con-
stitution provides:
A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family,
home and state, and for lawful hunting and recreational use.
The amendment guarantees a constitutional right but does not ad-
dress the extent (if any) to which this right can be regulated. Gen-
erally, the state can enact laws for the protection of the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens by virtue of the police power,
which is "the power of government inherent in every sovereignty to
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the general wel-
fare of its citizens." 7 The state of West Virginia, through the exercise
of police power, has historically regulated the keeping and bearing
of arms through statutory provisions.8 The extent of statute regu-
lation was never an issue prior to the adoption of the "Right to
Keep and Bear Arms Amendment" in November of 1986. However,
since the adoption of the amendment, the status of existing statutory
provisions regulating the keeping and bearing of arms was ques-
tionable, as was the extent (if any) to which the Legislature could
constitutionally enact laws infringing upon this right. Since there
was no real statement of legislative intent and little legislative history
surrounding the constitutional provision, 9 the burden of expressing
standards evaluating the balance between the right to bear arms and
4. Id.
5. In dicta, the United States Supreme Court recognized that most states have some provision
touching on the right to keep and bear arms, with the scope of that right dependent upon the language
employed. Miller, 307 U.S. at 182.
6. W. VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 22.
7. State ex. rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. Gainer, 149 W. Va. 740, 750, 143 S.E.2d 351,
359 (1965).
8. See McNeely, The Right of Who to Bear What, When, and Where-West Virginia Firearms
Law v. The Right-To-Bear-Arms Amendment, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 1125 (1987).
9. Id. at 1151-52.
[Vol. 91
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the valid exercise of police power in regulating that right ultimately
rests with the judiciary.
State v. Buckner'0 presented the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals the opportunity to assess the constitutionality of stat-
utory provisions against carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon and
to assess the extent to which the Legislature may regulate the keeping
and bearing of arms in light of the "Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Amendment." The court held that the provisions at issue were un-
constitutional but recognized that the right to keep and bear arms
is not absolute. This comment will discuss the Buckner decision in
terms of the criteria the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
found were relevant and that it will use when addressing the con-
stitutionality of other statutory provisions regulating the right to
keep and bear arms. Finally, it will analyze potential legislative ac-
tion in light of the Buckner decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The factual background giving rise to the West Virginia Supreme
Court's analysis of the "Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment"
is relatively simple and uncontroverted. After arresting a driver for
driving under the influence of alcohol, a Princeton city police officer
discovered a .22 caliber automatic pistol when searching the driver's
jacket pocket." The driver admitted having no license to carry the
pistol. 12
After the police officer presented this information to a magistrate
of Mercer County, the magistrate refused to issue a warrant for
carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon. 3 The magistrate concluded
that Chapter 61, Article 7, Section 1 of the. West Virginia Code
(hereinafter W. Va. Code),'14 the statutory provision against carrying
10. State v. Buckner, No. CC972 (f. Va. July 1, 1988) (WEsTLAW, 1988 WV 196576).
11. Id. No. CC972 at 1.
12. Id.
13. Id. No. CC972 at 2.
14. The provision against carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon provides as follows:
If any person, without a state license therefor or except as provided elsewhere in this article
and other provisions of this Code, carry about his person any revolver or pistol, dirk, bowie
knife, slung shot, razor, billy, metallic, or other false knuckles, or other dangerous or deadly
weapon of like kind or character, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. ...
W. VA. CODE § 61-7-1 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
1989]
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a dangerous or deadly weapon without a license, violated article III,
section 22.15
A writ of mandamus was then filed by the prosecuting attorney
in the Circuit Court of Mercer County seeking to compel the mag-
istrate to issue the warrant against the driver. 16 After a hearing, the
circuit judge concluded that the "Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Amendment" voided W. Va. Code § 61-7-1 since the statute pro-
hibits the carrying of firearms without a license.
17
The circuit court stayed the effect of the ruling and certified the
following questions to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals:
1. Is W. Va. Code Chapter 61, Article 7, Section I constitutional in light of the
subsequent adoption of Article 3, Section 22 of the Constitution of West Virginia?
2. May the Legislature of the State of West Virginia by proper legislation regulate
the right of a person to keep and bear arms in the State of West Virginia?18
The Court of Appeals concurred with the magistrate and circuit
court of Mercer County in answering the first certified question
"no" and holding that "the statute operates to impermissibly in-
fringe upon the constitutionally protected right to bear arms for
defense purposes."19
However, the court recognized that the right to bear arms is not
absolute by answering the second certified question "yes." The court
held that the West Virginia Legislature may regulate the right to
keep and bear arms through the valid exercise of police power. When
enacting legislation, "[tihe individual's right to keep and bear arms
and the state's duty, under its police power, to make regulations
for the purpose of protecting the health, safety and welfare of its
citizens must be balanced."
20
After the court's opinion in Buckner on July 1, 1988, the State
of West Virginia filed a petition for reconsideration of remedy on




19. Id., No. CC972 at 10.
20. Id., No. CC972 at 23.
[Vol. 91
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/7
STATE v. BUCKNER
July 19, 1988.21 The Attorney General's office asked the court to
delay the effect of the opinion until the Legislature could meet to
correct the unconstitutional provision. However, the court on De-
cember 20, 1988 voted unanimously not to reconsider the ruling
indicating that, if the issue was of an emergency nature, the Gov-
ernor or the Legislature itself could call a special legislative session
under appropriate rules to deal with the problem.
22
III. PRIOR LAw
A. Regulating the Keeping and Bearing of Arms
West Virginia has a long and very colorful history in regulating
the keeping and bearing of arms.213 A brief review of this history
illustrates that the first limitation was carried over from Virginia..in
1863 when West Virginia was formed. This early statute simply rec-
ognized that a bond may be required if a person goes armed with
a deadly or dangerous weapon, but individuals with reasonable cause
for self-defense were exempted from the regulation.2 4 Obviously this
first statute did little in regulating the carrying of weapons.
The Legislature revised the statute in 1873, eliminating the self-
defense exception in the original statute and imposing a duty upon
any justice of the peace to cause the arrest of any person within
21. Attorney General's petition for reconsideration of remedy at 13, Buckner, No. CC972 (WES-
TLAW, 1988 WV 196576).
22. Dominion Post, Dec. 21, 1988, at 1A, col. 1; The Charleston Gazette, Dec. 21, 1988, at
IA, col. 1.
23. This history has been well documented by James W. McNeely in his article titled The Right
of Who to Bear What, When, and Where-West Virginia Firearms Law v. The Right to Bear Arms
Amendment, supra note 8.
24. "If any person go armed with a deadly or dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause
to fear violence to his person, family, or property, he may be required to give a recognizance, with
the right to appeal, as before provided, and like proceedings shall be had on appeal." W. VA. CODE
ch. 153, § 8 (1868) (amended 1872-73 W. VA. ACTS ch. 226; amended W. VA. CODE ch. 148, § 7
(1884); amended W. VA. CODE ch. 148, § 7 (West Supp. 1909); amended W. VA. CODE ch. 148 §
7 (Barne's Supp. 1923); amended 1925 W. VA. ACTS ch. 95, § 7; amended W. VA. CODE ch. 148,
§ 7 (Barne's Supp. 1925); recodified W. VA. CODE § 61-7-1 (1931); amended W. VA. CODE § 61-7-
1 (1975); current version at W. VA. CODE § 61-7-1 (Repl. Vol. 1988)).
1989]
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his county in the habit of carrying concealed weapons. 25 Upon con-
viction, an individual was to be fined not in excess of ten dollars
with no jail sentences possible. By defining the offense as "habit-
ually carrying" concealed weapons and imposing only a small fine
upon offenders, West Virginia continued to be a state relatively free
from statutory provisions regulating the bearing of arms.
The Legislature enacted a more restrictive statute, similar to the
one held unconstitutional in Buckner, in 1882.26 This statute totally
prohibited the carrying of dangerous or deadly weapons except in
the case of law officers and people carrying such weapons on their
own premises. 27 Unlike the predecessor statute, the 1882 provision
prohibited any carrying of weapons, not just those weapons that
25. The 1873 provision states as follows:
If a justice shall, from his own observation or upon information of others, have good
reason to believe that any person in his county is habitually carrying about his person
concealed weapons, such as dirks, bowie knives, pistols or other dangerous weapons, it
shall be the duty of such justice to cause such person to be arrested and brought before
him, and if such person upon trial shall be found guilty, he shall be fined not exceeding
ten dollars.
1872-73 W. VA. AcTs ch. 226 § 168 (current version at W. VA. CODE § 61-7-I (Repl. Vol. 1988)).
For the history of the development of this statute, see supra note 23.
26. The 1882 provision states as follows:
If a person carry about his person any revolver or other pistol, dirk, bowie knife, razor,
sling shot, billy, metallic or other false knuckles, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon
of like kind or character, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined . . .; and if any
person shall sell or furnish any such weapon as is hereinbefore mentioned to a person whom
he knows, or has reason, from his appearance or otherwise, to believe to be under the age
of twenty-one years, he shall be punished as hereinbefore provided; but nothing herein
contained shall be so construed as to prevent any person from keeping or carrying about
his dwelling house or premises any such revolver or other pistol, or from carrying the same
from the place of purchase to his dwelling house, or from his dwelling house to any place
where repairing is done, to have it repaired, and back again. And if upon the trial of an
indictment for carrying any such pistol, dirk, razor or bowie knife, the defendant shall
prove to the satisfaction of the jury that he is a quiet and peaceable citizen, of good character
and standing in the community in which he lives, and at the time he was found with such
pistol, dirk, razor or bowie knife, as charged in the indictment, he had good cause to believe
and did believe that he was in danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of another
person, and that he was, in good faith, carrying such weapon for self defense and for no
other purpose, the jury shall find him not guilty. But nothing in this section contained shall
be so construed as to prevent any officer charged with the execution of the laws of the
state from carrying a revolver or pistol, dirk or bowie knife.
W. VA. CODE ch. 148, § 7 (1884) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 61-7-1 (Repl. Vol. 1988)). For
the history of this statute, see, supra note 23.
27. Id.
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are carried in a concealed manner. 28 However, the statute recognized
an exception for self-defense. To invoke the exception, a defendant
had the burden of proving good character and standing in the com-
munity in addition to a good faith belief that he was in danger of
death or great bodily harm at the hands of another person. Should
a defendant meet the burden, the jury was bound by the statute to
find him not guilty.
This broad prohibition against carrying dangerous or deadly
weapons was enacted in conjunction with the "Red Men Acts,
' 29
giving some indication of the influences surrounding passage of the
statute. The "Red Men Acts" were criminal conspiracy statutes en-
acted to combat bands of outlaws throughout the state known as
"Red Men," "Regulators," "Vigilante Committees," and "White
Caps."30 These groups of men, more commonly known as the Klu
Klux Klan, organized in secret and appeared in disguise to inflict
punishment and death upon those peaceful citizens condemned under
their rule of law. Faced with the impossibility of establishing secret
conspiracies, through the "Red Men Acts" the Legislature presumed
a conspiracy to exist when two or more individuals were caught in
such acts of destruction. 31 Thus, early statutory regulations prohib-
iting the carrying of dangerous or deadly weapons were influenced
by a legislative intent to combat underground activity carried over
from the Civil War.
One notable case interpreting the 1882 statutory provision is State
v. Workman.32 Workman was charged with carrying a pistol in vi-
olation of the prohibition against carrying a dangerous or deadly
weapon.33 The constitutionality of the statute was challenged under
a due process theory since the defendant was required to prove that
he was "a quiet and peaceful citizen, of good character and standing
28. See, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
29. W. VA. CODE ch. 148, §§ 9, 10 (1884) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 61-6-7 (Repl.
Vol. 1988)).
30. State v. Porter, 25 W. Va. 685, 689 (1885).
31. Id. See also State v. Bingham, 42 W. Va. 234, 24 S.E. 883 (1896), overruled, 140 W. Va.
610, 87 S.E.2d 689 (1955).
32. State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367, 14 S.E. 9 (1891).
33. Id. at 368-69, 14 S.E. at 10.
19891
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in the community" to establish a defense under the statute. 34 The
court rejected this argument and held that there is a general right
to self-defense stemming from the United States Constitution and
the West Virginia Constitution, 35 a right guaranteed to all persons.3 6
The statute merely provided a presumption of acquittal for persons
who showed good moral character and a need to carry arms for
self-defense. 37 The statute did not deprive persons of self-defense
who failed to show good ioral character. It only neglected to give
this group the presumption. 38
After upholding the statute under the due process challenge, the
court addressed the constitutionality of the statute in light of the
second amendment to the United States Constitution. 39 Recognizing
that authorities at that time differed as to whether the second
amendment applied to the states,4 ° the court justified its conclusion
as if the amendment did apply to states. 41 Regarding the "well reg-
ulated militia" language of the second amendment, the court clas-
sified swords, guns, rifles, and muskets as weapons of warfare used
by militia that fail within the protection of the second amendment,
but explicitly held pistols to be outside the realm of protection. 42
Therefore, Workman, who carried a pistol, was properly charged
with a violation of the statute.
Once the Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the 1882 statute, the
state maintained its broad prohibition against carrying a dangerous
or deadly weapon until 1909, when the West Virginia Legislature
enacted a weapons licensing statute. 43 The new statute permitted the
carrying of a dangerous or deadly weapon provided a person first
obtain a state license. 44 To obtain a license, an applicant needed to
34. Id. at 369-72, 14 S.E. at 10-11.
35. Id. at 370, 14 S.E. at 10.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 371, 14 S.E. at 10-11.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 372-75, 14 S.E. at 11-12.
40. Id. at 372, 14 S.E. at 11.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 373, 14 S.E. at 11.
43. W. VA. CODE ch. 148, § 7 (Supp. 1909) (current version at W. V1A. CODE § 61-7-1 (Repl.
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demonstrate a good reason for carrying a weapon and to meet other
minimum qualifications, including the posting of a sizeable bond.
45
The purpose of the statute was found to be the "[r]estraint of all
evil wrought by the use of deadly weapons .... "46 The court nec-
essarily followed a path of rigid enforcement in giving effect to the
statute's broad effort to combat the criminal use of weapons as well
as prevent injury by careless or negligent use of deadly weapons. 47
Thus, the state maintained a policy of strict prohibition against car-
rying arms as established in Workman.48
The requirements for obtaining a license were amended in the
first extraordinary session of the 1925 legislature. 49 During this ses-
sion the Legislature rewrote the 1909 provision and strengthened
weapon regulations by requiring United States citizenship and West
Virginia residency for license applicants, increasing application fees,
and requiring sellers of firearms to keep accurate records.5 0 Also,
the added language made it unlawful to carry a weapon, licensed
or unlicensed, in "a way or manner to cause, or threaten, a breach
of the peace."' 51 The definition of weapons was expanded in a new
subsection to include machine guns, sub-machine guns and high
powered rifles, but the new subsection exempted the use of weapons
for target practice and hunting pursuant to a hunting license.
5 2
The legislative motive for making the weapons provisions more
stringent stemmed from the labor wars existing during this period
of time. During the early 1900's, unions attempted to organize West
Virginia's many coal mines, seeking better wages and better working
conditions. Union activity led to strikes and increased tension be-
tween the mine operators and the workers. Both sides were heavily
armed, as exemplified by a typical strike at Cabin Creek and Paint
45. Id.
46. State v. Blazovitch, 88 W. Va. 612, 615, 107 S.E. 291, 292 (1921).
47. Id. at 614, 107 S.E. at 292. See also State v. Kinney, 92 W. Va. 272, 114 S.E. 677 (1922)
and State v. Merico, 77 W. Va. 314, 87 S.E. 370 (1915), overruled, 305 S.E.2d 284 (1983).
48. Blazovitch, 88 W. Va. at 614, 107 S.E. at 292.
49. W. VA. CODE ch. 148 § 7 (Supp. 1925) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 61-7-1 (Repl.
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Creek in 1912 where the government confiscated 1,872 high-powered
rifles, 556 pistols, six machine guns, 225,000 rounds of ammunition,
480 blackjacks, and a large number of assorted other weapons."
Such bearing of arms by strikers and mine operators led to the
famous gunfight in 1920 known as the "Matewan Massacre" in
Mingo County which left twelve dead . 4 In light of the possibility
of continued labor violence, the Legislature enacted the more strin-
gent license provisions and added a restriction against employees
carrying weapons upon the premises of their employer. 5
In light of these license provisions, the court in State v. Foley5 6
was faced with a claim of self-defense by a murder trial defendant
who carried a .32 caliber revolver without a state license. The de-
fendant argued that the trial court erred by requiring him to answer
cross-examination questions regarding whether or not he had a li-
cense to carry a pistol on the date in question. 8 Stating that "[t]he
law of self-defense is part and parcel of the law of homicide, and
the right to arm for self-defense is distinct from a license to carry
a pistol . . . "59 the court held that compelling the defendant to
answer the questions constituted reversible error. Thus, the fact that
the accused carried a dangerous or deadly weapon in violation of
the state licensing statute in no way impaired his right to assert the
claim of self-defense.
From this historical background, the current statutory provisions
which regulate arms have evolved with only minor changes.6 During
the 1931 recodification, the 1925 amendments were recodified in
Article 7, Chapter 61 of the West Virginia Code without change.
The license provision was then amended in 1975 with only minor
changes, such as the addition of a minimum qualification for the
53. H. La, BLOODL.ETTING IN APPALAcHIA, 32-33 (1969).
54. Id. at 55.
55. W. VA. CODE ch. 148 § 76 (Supp. 1925) (current version at W.VA. CODE § 61-7-1 (Repl.
Vol. 1988).
56. State v. Foley, 128 W. Va. 166, 35 S.E.2d 854 (1945).
57. Id. at 167-70, 35 S.E.2d at 855-59.
58. Id. at 178, 35 S.E.2d at 860.
59. Id. at 181, 35 S.E.2d at 861.
60. McNeely, supra note 8 at 1141.
[Vol. 91
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/7
STATE v. BUCKNER
handling and firing of firearms and an increase in license fees.6 1
B. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment
At the behest of gun owners in West Virginia, the National Rifle
Association, and the West Virginia State Rifle and Pistol Associ-
ation, the "Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment" was intro-
duced in the West Virginia Legislature on February 21, 1985, as
House Joint Resolution 18.62 The only debate concerning this bill
was whether the word "lawful" should be added in front of "self-
defense."'63 The word was added to the House bill, but the Senate
deleted it. 4 The Senate version prevailed.6 5 Consequently, the lan-
guage as originally introduced was approved by the House, ninety-
two to six, and the Senate, thirty-one to three,6 6 on April 12, 1985.67
Thus, the "Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment" attained
the necessary two-thirds vote from the Legislature to enable the plac-
ing of the amendment on the ballot for voter approval. Such a wide
margin of approval, combined with the failed attempts of a few
legislators to weaken the language of the amendment, put the "Right
to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment" well on its way to becoming
a constitutional provision.
The amendment left the Legislature with a small minority of
opposition. Delegate James McNeely opposed the amendment and
carried that sentiment over into the campaign period prior to the
general election. The opponents' main argument centered upon the
premise that the effect of this amendment was unknown. Most em-
phasized were the possibilities that the amendment would take away
legislative power to regulate handguns and that current statutory
provisions regulating arms could be ruled unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court of Appeals.68 Opponents reasoned that, given a lit-
61. W. VA. CODE § 61-7-2 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
62. McNeely, supra note 8, at 1141. House Joint Resolution 18 was originally introduced in
the same language as the current "Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment."
63. Id. at 1143.
64. Id. at 1144.
65. Id. at 1145-46.
66. Id. at 1146.
67. Id.
68. The Charleston Gazette, Oct. 24, 1986, at 5A, col. 1.
1989]
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eral interpretation of the amendment, the Legislature could not reg-
ulate the bearing of arms since such conduct might be for self-
defense.69 McNeely went even further and asserted that the broad
language could be used to challenge state laws denying gun permits
to convicted felons or aliens. 70
Supporters of the amendment stressed that it enhanced and en-
forced the right to bear arms guaranteed by the federal Constitution.
The United Sportsmen of West Virginia, a political action com-
mittee, was formed for the purpose of persuading the public to vote
in favor of the "Right t6 Keep and Bear Arms Amendment."
Through two advertisements which ran in major newspapers
throughout the state7' prior to the general election, voters were in-
formed of the need to support the amendment. The Committee
stressed that forty states already had similar state constitutional
amendments, that the amendment was supported by most govern-
ment officials and over 50,000 NRA members in West Virginia, and
that the amendment would prevent infringement of the individual
right to keep and bear arms for constitutionally protected purposes.
The advertisements also stressed that concealed weapons and in-
struments of mass destruction may be regulated under the amend-
ment.
The voters of West Virginia approved the amendment on No-
vember 4, 1986 by a vote of 342,963 to 67,168. With more than
five votes in favor to every one vote opposed, the amendment passed
in every county in the state. 72
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Analysis of Case
Before addressing the constitutionality of W. Va. Code § 61-7-
1, the statutory provision against carrying a dangerous or deadly
69. Id.
70. The Charleston Gazette, Oct. 30, 1986, at 4A, col. 1.
71. For a full reprint of the newspaper advertisements, see McNeely, supra note 8, at 1179-
81.
72. Official Election Returns, General Election 1986, quoted in McNeely, supra note 8, at 1151.
[Vol. 91
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/7
STATE v. BUCKNER
weapon, Chief Justice McHugh, speaking for a unanimous court,
recognized that West Virginia has a long history of regulating the
use of weapons through statutory provisions. 73 Of importance in the
court's historical discussion was the analysis given in State v. Work-
man,74 discussed earlier. The Buckner court, however, dismissed the
use of the Workman analysis in light of the new constitutional
provision"5 as the Workman court had focused upon the "well reg-
ulated militia" language of the second amendment 6 while the state
constitutional provision was considered broader in its guarantee of
the right to keep and bear arms.
In dismissing the Workman analysis, the court implicitly rec-
ognized pistols as falling within the protection of the new amend-
ment. The Workman court defined protected arms as those that a
militia would normally possess and explicitly stated that pistols fail
to meet this test. 7 By recognizing that this definition of arms is not
applicable and that the state amendment is a broader definition of
a constitutional right, the Buckner court included pistols within the
protection of the amendment.
Proceeding to consider the first certified question before it, the
constitutionality of W. Va. Code § 61-7-1 in light of the amendment,
the court established basic principles of constitutional construction 7
as it could find no real statement of legislative intent. 79 Noting that
the general rules of statutory construction also apply to constitu-
tional construction, 0 the court concluded that the amendment must
be applied in light of its plain meaning since the language is clear
and unambiguous."'
With these principles established, the court held W. Va. Code
§ 61-7-1 unconstitutional since the statute operates to impermissibly
73. Buckner, No. CC972 at 4.
74. State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367, 14 S.E. 9 (1891).
75. Buckner, No. CC972 at 10.
76. Id., No. CC972 at 7.
77. Workman, 35 W. Va. at 373, 14 S.E. at 11.
78. Buckner, No. CC972 at 9-10.
79. Id., No. CC972 at 9.
80. Id., citing State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 157 W. Va. 100, 108, 207 S.E.2d 421,
427 (1973).
81. Buckner, No. CC972 at 10.
1989]
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infringe upon the constitutionally protected right to carry dangerous
or deadly weapons for the defense of self, family, home and state.82
Since the statutory provision totally proscribed the carrying of a
dangerous or deadly weapon absent a license or other authorization,
the court held the provision overbroad and violative of the amend-
ment. 83 In support of its conclusion, the court cited, along with other
cases, City of Lakewood v. Pillow,84 In re Brickey,85 and State v.
Blocker.8 6 In these cases, statutes or ordinances were voided in light
of a state constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to bear
arms for defense. Since the authorities are cited several times in the
Buckner decision, a closer look at these cases helps to focus the
court's analysis of the West Virginia amendment.
In City of Lakewood v. Pillow, the Colorado Supreme Court
interpreted the constitutionality of an ordinance which made it un-
lawful to possess, carry or use dangerous or deadly weapons." The
court noted that the ordinance was so general that it made it un-
lawful for a person to possess a firearm in a vehicle, possess a
firearm in a place of business for the purpose of self-defense, trans-
fer guns to and from gunsmiths, or operate a business as a gunsmith,
pawnbroker or sporting goods store.88 The court stated that several
82. Id.
83. Id., No. CC972 at 10-12.
84. City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20, 501 P.2d 744 (1972).
85. In re Brickey, 8 Idaho 597, 70 P. 609 (1902).
86. State v. Blocker, 291 Or. 255, 630 P.2d 824 (1981).
87. LAKEWOOD, CoLo., ORDIANCE No. 0-70-47, §§ 3-9 provide as follows:
Unlawful to Possess, Carry or Use Dangerous or Deadly Weapons. (a) It shall be unlawful
for any person to have in his possession, except within his own domicile, or to carry or
use, a revolver or pistol, shotgun or rifle of any description, which may be used for the
explosion of cartridges, or any air gun, gas operated gun or spring gun, or any bow made
for the purpose of throwing or projecting missiles of any kind by any means whatsoever;
provided that nothing in this section shall prevent use of any such instruments in shooting
galleries or ranges under circumstances when such instruments can be fired, discharged or
operated in such manner as not to endanger persons or property and also in such manner
as to prevent the projectile from traversing any grounds or space outside the limits of such
gallery or range; and provided further, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to
prevent the carrying of any type of gun; when unloaded, or any bow, to or from any range,
gallery or hunting areas. (b) Nothing in this section shall prevent the possession or use of
any of said instruments by persons duly licensed for such purpose by the City of Lakewood.
(c) Nothing in this section shall prevent the use of or possession of any said instrument
by law enforcement personnel.
88. City of Lakewood, 180 Colo. at 23, 501 P.2d at 745.
[Vol. 91
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of these activities are constitutionally protected 9 and that all of them
may be free from criminal culpability depending upon the circum-
stances. 90 Addressing the issue of regulation of constitutional rights,
the court warned that regulation under the police power may not
be achieved by unnecessarily broad provisions that invade the pro-
tected freedoms. 91 Legitimate governmental purposes cannot be
achieved by means that stifle fundamental personal liberties when
those ends can be more narrowly achieved.
92
The case of In re Brickey also involved a constitutional challenge
to a city ordinance prohibiting the carrying of deadly weapons within
the city limits. 93 The Supreme Court of Idaho noted that under con-
stitutional provisions94 guaranteeing the right to bear arms for se-
curity and defense, the legislature can regulate the exercise of that
right, but may not prohibit it.91
A provision infringing upon the right to bear arms was also
voided in State v. Blocker. This case involved a constitutional appeal
of a conviction for carrying a "billy club ' 96 outside of the home.
The Oregon Supreme Court held that possession of a billy club in
public was protected by the constitutional right to bear arms.97 The
text of the constitutional provision at issue did not limit the right
89. The right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property,
or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing
herein contained shall be construed to justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons. CoLo. CONST.
art. II, § 13.
90. City of Lakewood at 23, 501 P.2d at 745.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. In re Brickey, 8 Idaho at 598, 70 P. at 609.
94. The people have the right to bear arms for the security and defense, but the legislature
shall regulate the exercise of this right by law. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11, quoted in In Re Brickey,
8 Idaho at 598, 70 P. at 609.
95. In re Brickey, 8 Idaho at 599, 70 P. at 609.
96. Defendant was convicted of possessing a "billy" in violation of ORS 166.510(1):
(I) Except as provided in ORS 166.515 or 166.520, any person who manufactures, causes
to be manufactured, sells, keeps for sale, offers, gives, loans, carries, or possesses an in-
strument or weapon having a blade which projects or swings into position by force of a
spring or other device and commonly known as a switchblade knife or an instrument or
weapon commonly known as a blackjack, slug shot, billy, sandclub, sandbag, sap glove or
metal knuckles, or who carries a dirk, dagger or stiletto commits a Class A misdemeanor.
97. The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defense of themselves, and the State,
but the Military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power. OR. CONST. art., I § 27.
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to bear arms only to the home. 98 The court found that the challenged
statute totally prohibited the possession of weapons and that it was
not merely a restriction on the manner of possession of certain weap-
ons. The Blocker court held that this total proscription violated the
constitutionally protected right to keep and bear arms for defense. 99
The West Virginia Supreme Court also credits the Blocker court with
an insightful discussion of the overbreadth doctrine.1 °
Although the West Virginia Supreme Court in Buckner correctly
held W. Va. Code § 61-7-1 unconstitutional in light of the "Right
to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment," the court failed to identify
reasons for finding the statute overbroad. However, several possible
reasons are identifiable. While assessing the statutory boundaries
regulating the bearing of arms in West Virginia, it was necessary
for the court to consider the prohibitions against carrying weapons
absent a license in conjunction with the recognized statutory ex-
ceptions to the license requirement, W. Va. Code § 61-7-3.1 Ba-
98. Blocker, 291 Or. at 259, 630 P.2d at 825.
99. Id. at 260, 630 P.2d at 826.
100. The Blocker court discussed the overbreadth doctrine as follows:
An "overbroad" law, as that term has been developed by the United States Supreme
Court, is not vague, or need not be. Its vice is not failure to communicate. Its vice may
be clarity. For a law is overbroad to the extent that it announces a prohibition that reaches
conduct which may not be prohibited. A legislature can make as law as "broad" and
inclusive as it chooses unless it reaches into constitutionally protected ground. The clearer
an "overbroad" statute is, the harder it is to confine it by interpretation within its con-
stitutionally permissible reach.
It follows that to attack a statute as "overbroad" necessarily implies that it impinges
on some constitutionally protected right other than fair notice or "due process." Unlike
"vagueness," the vice of "overbreadth" is not necessarily limited to penal laws, and to
the extent that an overbroad law forbids what may not constitutionally be forbidden, it is
invalid as such without regard to the facts in the individual case.
Id. at 261, 630 P.2d at 827.
101. W. VA. CODE § 61-7-3 (Repl. Vol. 1988) provides in part:
Nothing in this article shall prevent any person from carrying any such weapon as is men-
tioned in the first section [§ 61-7-I] of this article, in good faith and not having felonious
purposes, upon his own premises; nor shall anything herein prevent a person from carrying
any such weapon, unloaded, from the place of purchase to his home or residence, or to
a place of repair and back to his home or residence; nor shall anything herein prevent a
guard . . .from carrying any such weapon while on duty; nor shall anything herein prevent
any member of a properly organized target-shooting club authorized by law to obtain fire-
arms by purchase or requisition from this state, or from the United States for the purpose
of target practice, from carrying any revolver or pistol mentioned in this article, unloaded,
from his home or place of residence to a place of target practice, and from any such place
[Vol. 91
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sically, by statute it is not a violation to carry a dangerous or deadly
weapon without a license upon your own premises, to and from a
place of repair, from the place of purchase, and for purposes of
hunting.
Although the court did not expressly include W. Va. Code § 61-
7-3 in its discussion of the first certified question, holding W. Va.
Code § 61-7-1 unconstitutional means that the prohibiting statute
along with the statutory exceptions are overbroad restrictions upon
the constitutional right. Put simply, the exceptions to the license
requirement were not sufficient to guarantee the individual the right
to keep and bear arms for defense. Had the exceptions to the license
requirement been sufficient, the court could not have held the stat-
utory provision unconstitutional. The constitutional amendment ap-
parently guarantees a right to keep and bear arms absent a license
in situations other than those listed in the statute. The court might
have felt that the constitutional amendment guarantees a right to
bear arms in an automobile, to and from work, while at work, and
between place of employment and a target range. Thus, the failure
to include any of these exceptions under W. Va. Code § 61-7-3 would
provide an explanation for holding W. Va. Code § 61-7-1 uncon-
stitutional.
Another explanation for holding the statute overbroad might lie
in its language of "dangerous or deadly weapons." Dangerous or
deadly weapons are defined as "any revolver or pistol, dirk, bowie
knife, sling shot, razor, billy, metallic or other false knuckles, or
of target practice back to his home or residence, for using any such weapon at such place
of target practice in training and improving his skill in the use of such weapons: but nothing
herein shall be construed to authorize any employee of any person, firm or corporation
doing business in this [s]tate to carry, on or about the premises of such employer, any such
pistol, or weapon mentioned in this article, for which a license is herein required, without
having first obtained the license and given the bond as herein provided.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this article or any other provision of this [clode,
any resident, nonresident or unnaturalized person may lawfully possess, transport, carry
and use any firearm he is permitted to use for hunting under any valid license he has been
issued by the department of natural resources and which he holds in his possession. At all
times such person shall comply with all of the requirements of law set forth in this [c]ode
and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder pertaining to possessing, transporting,
carrying and using firearms for hunting.
W. VA. CODE § 61-7-3 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
19891
17
Callaghan: State v. Buckner and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms in West Virg
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
other dangerous or deadly weapon of like kind or charac-
ter .... "102 One need only examine case law in West Virginia to
see the broad definition given to arms under the Code. For example,
in State v. Choat'03 the defendant was charged with carrying a dan-
gerous or deadly weapon, a knife with a five and one-half inch
blade.' 4 The trial judge held as a matter of law that the knife was
a dangerous or deadly weapon under the statutory provision. 05 The
West Virginia Supreme Court reversed this ruling on the basis that
it is for the jury to decide under the circumstances if the knife was
a dangerous or deadly instrument. 0 6 The jury must conclude that
the purpose of carrying the knife was its use as a weapon before
there is a violation of the statute. Nonetheless, under such a broad
definition of arms, carrying a fishing or hunting knife could be
construed as carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon. Thus, the def-
inition of arms in W. Va. Code § 61-7-1 is overbroad in light of
the new constitutional amendment, under which such activity ob-
viously would be protected.
The West Virginia Supreme Court correctly concluded that W.
Va. Code § 61-7-1 sweeps so broadly as to infringe upon a newly
granted constitutional right, that to keep and bear arms in defense
of self, family, home and state. The court was presented with a
provision that used clear and plain language in expressing a right
of each West Virginian. Legislative intent was absent, as was any
statement of public policy. Presented with such a situation, the court
was left with the traditional methods of constitutional analysis. When
placed beside the constitutional provision, the statute encroached
upon some of the protected areas. Any other construction of the
amendment would serve only to circumvent the plain meaning of a
constitutional provision adopted by the people of this state.
Having held the Code provision unconstitutional, the court ad-
dressed the second certified question: whether the West Virginia Leg-
102. W. VA. CODE § 61-7-1 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
103. State v. Choat, 363 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1987).
104. Id. at 495.
105. Id. at 499.
106. Id. at 499-503. The court noted that although the "Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amend-
ment" had been enacted at the time of the decision, the alleged crime took place before the amendment
was ratified. Thus, the amendment did not apply to this case.
[Vol. 91
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islature may regulate at all the right of a person to keep and bear
arms in the state of West Virginia. The court adopted the universal
rule that a constitutional right to keep and bear arms is not absolute,
such right being subject to reasonable regulation through the state's
police power 10 7 to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens. 08
The court then cautioned that even a legitimate governmental pur-
pose cannot stifle the right to bear arms when that purpose can be
more narrowly achieved. 0 9 For the remainder of the opinion, the
court acted in an advisory capacity, discussing statutory regulations
in other jurisdictions also having a right to keep and bear arms
amendment.110
The most common regulation is the prohibition against the pos-
session or ownership of handguns by persons previously convicted
of a felony."' 1 Other common provisions include prohibitions against
the carrying of handguns without a license, against the carrying of
only concealed handguns without a license, and against the carrying
of handguns in specific places." 2 The open carrying of arms has
been defined as follows: "[T]he weapon must be open to ordinary
observation to those who may come in contact in the usual and
107. The police power in West Virginia has been defined below:
The police power is the power of the state, inherent in every sovereignty, to enact
laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the welfare of its citizens. The police power
is difficult to define precisely, because it is extensive, elastic and constantly evolving to
meet new and increasing demands for its exercise for the benefit of society and to promote
the general welfare. It embraces the power of the state to preserve and to promote the
general welfare and it is concerned with whatever affects the peace, security, safety, morals,
health and general welfare of the community. It cannot be circumscribed within narrow
limits nor can it be confined to precedents resting alone on conditions of the past. As
society becomes increasingly complex and as advancements are made, the police power must
of necessity evolve, develop and expand, in the public interest, to meet such conditions.
State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. Gainer, 149 W. Va. 740, 741, 143 S.E.2d 351, 354 (1965).
108. The court cited the representative cases of Bristow v. State, 418 So. 2d 927, 930 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1982); People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 102-03, 544 P.2d 385, 390-91 (1975); State v. Rupp,
282 N.W.2d 125, 130 (Iowa 1979); In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn. 1980); State v.
Angelo, 3 N.J. Misc. 1014, 1015, 130 A. 458, 459 (1925); State v. Dees, 100 N.M. 252, 254-55, 669
P.2d 261, 263-64 (Ct. App. 1983); Commofiwealth v. Ray, 218 Pa. Super. 72, 272 A.2d 275 (1970)
vacated, 448 Pa. 307, 292 A.2d 410 (1972); and Carfield v. State, 649 P.2d 865, 871 (Wyo. 1982).
109. Buckner, No. CC972 at 16. The court again refers to City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 180
Colo. 20, 501 P.2d 744 (1972).
110. Buckner, No. CC972 at 12-22.
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ordinary associations with one carrying the weapon.""' Conse-
quently, concealed arms are those that are not readily identifiable
by the public as being carried by an individual. The offense of car-
rying concealed arms could include carrying a deadly weapon in a
handbag or purse," 4 under a jacket," 5 or in a briefcase." 6
The court also addressed the requirements under W. Va. Code
§ 61-7-2 7 for obtaining a license to carry a dangerous or deadly
weapon. The license requirements were found by the court to be
similar to those of other states with similar constitutional provisions
that protect the right to keep and bear arms, except for the re-
quirement that an applicant post a $5,000 surety bond." 8 Thus, by
113. Prince v. Commonwealth, 277 S.W.2d 470 (Ky. 1955).
114. Schaaf v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 429, 258 S.E.2d 574 (1979).
115. State v. Nerwinski, 69 N.J. Super. 239, 174 A.2d 232 (1961), cert. denied 369 U.S. 825
(1962).
116. People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 255 N.Y.S.2d 833, 205 N.E.2d 176 (1964), cert. denied
380 U.S. 936 (1965), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 382 U.S. 20 (1965) (dismissed for want of
jurisdiction). "Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari,
certiorari is denied." Id., appeal dismissed, 383 U.S. 575 (1966) (for lack of substantial federal ques-
tion).
117. The West Virginia Code provides in part:
(a) Any person desiring to obtain a state license to carry any such weapon as is mentioned
in the first section of this article [§ 61-7-1], . . . upon application to such court, it may
grant such license to such person, in the following manner, to wit:
(b) The applicant shall file with such court his application in writing, duly verified, which
application shall show, as basic qualifications, as follows:
(1) That such applicant is a citizen of the United States of America;
(2) That the applicant has been a bona fide resident of this state for at least one year next
prior to the date of such application, and of the county sixty days prior thereto;
(3) That the applicant is over eighteen years of age; that he is a person of good moral
character, of temperate habits, not addicted to intoxication, not addicted to the use of any
controlled substance, and has not been convicted of a felony or of any offense involving
the use on his part of such weapon in an unlawful manner, and shall prove to the satisfaction
of the court that he is gainfully employed in a lawful occupation and has been so engaged
for a period of five years next preceding the date of his application;
(4) The purpose or purposes for which the applicant desires to carry such weapon, the
necessity therefor, and the county or counties in which such license is desired to be effective;
and
(5) That the applicant has qualified under minimum requirements for handling and firing
such firearms. These minimum requirements are those promulgated by the department of
natural resources and attained under the auspices of the department of natural resources:
Provided, That the court may waive this requirement in the case of a renewal applicant
who has previously qualified.
W. VA. CoDa § 61-7-2 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
118. Buckner, No. CC972 at 20-22.
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implication the court approved the statutory requirements (excluding
the $5,000 surety bond provision) for obtaining a state license.
B. Implications
The West Virginia Legislature may regulate the right of a person
to keep and bear arms. The Buckner opinion illustrates that it is
the duty of the Legislature to enumerate precise boundaries regu-
lating the right to keep and bear arms that do not sweep so broad
as to infringe upon the constitutionally protected right. The Leg-
islature must balance the individual's right against the state's duty
to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. However,
the correctness of the legislative balance remains subject to judicial
review as a constitutional right is involved. As is evident from Buck-
ner, the court will not uphold regulations when the reason for the
regulation does not justify the infringement upon the right.
Subsequent to the passage of the constitutional amendment in
November of 1986,119 the West Virginia Legislature failed to make
any changes to the statutory provisions. The failure to adjust those
statutory provisions resulted in the Buckner decision. Consequently,
West Virginia effectively is without any remedy to prohibit the car-
rying of dangerous or deadly weapons. The Legislature could decide
not to enact legislation prohibiting the carrying of dangerous or
deadly weapons, choosing to rely instead upon other statutory pro-
visions. For example, anyone who carries, exposes, brandishes, or
uses arms in a way or manner to cause, or threaten, a breach of
the peace could be arrested and prosecuted. 20 The "breach of the
peace" method of regulating the carrying of arms would be con-
stitutional since there is no infringement upon the right to bear arms
for defense purposes. A violation would occur only when a person
uses a weapon in an offensive manner. Obviously, regulating weap-
ons under this approach would do nothing to prevent arms being
used in such an offensive manner.
Prior to the Buckner decision and subsequent to the passage of
the amendment, an effort was made in the state Senate to amend
119. See, supra note 70 and accompanying text.
120. W. VA. CODE § 61-7-10 (1984).
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sections one, two, and three of the dangerous weapons article to
align those provisions with the constitutional amendment. Senate Bill
No. 142121 was introduced by Senator Larry Tucker on January 15,
1988. The bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary which
recommended that the bill be adopted. 122 However, the Senate failed
to vote on the bill due to time constraints and pending legislation
121. The bill provides in part as follows:
Any person who, without a state license therefore or except as provided elsewhere in this
article and other provisions of this code, carries concealed any revolver or pistol, dirk,
bowie knife, sling shot, razor, billy metallic or other false knuckles, or other dangerous or
deadly weapon of like kind or character, shall be guilty ....
Nothing in this article shall prevent any person from carrying any such weapon as is men-
tioned in the first section of this article, in good faith and not having felonious purposes,
upon his or her own premises; nor shall anything herein prevent a person from carrying
any such weapon, unloaded, from the place of purchase to his or her home or residence,
between his or her home and place of business, between his or her home or place of business
and a place of target practice, or to a place of repair and back to his or her home or
residence; nor shall anything herein prevent a guard . . .; nor shall anything herein prevent
any member of a properly organized target-shooting club authorized by law to obtain fire-
arms by purchase or requisition from this state, or from the United States for the purpose
of target practice, from carrying any revolver or pistol mentioned in this article, unloaded,
from his or her home or place of residence to a place of target practice, and from any
such place of target practice back to his or her home or residence, or using any such weapon
at such place of target practice in training and improving skill in the use of such weapons;
but nothing herein shall be construed to authorize any employee of any person, firm or
corporation doing business in this state to carry, on or about the premises of such employer,
any such pistol, or other weapon mentioned in this article, for which a license is herein
required, without having first obtained the license.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this article or any other provision of this code, any
resident, nonresident or unnaturalized person may lawfully possess, transport, carry and
use any firearms he is permitted to use for hunting under any valid license he has been
issued by the department of natural resources and which he holds in his possession. At all
times such person shall comply with all of the requirements of law set forth in this code
and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder pertaining to possessing, transporting,
carrying and using firearms for hunting.
NOTE: The purpose of this bill is to change language in code sections regarding the offense
of carrying a dangerous weapon without a license and the application process and require-
ments for such a license so that:
(1) Carrying such a weapon without a license "concealed" (rather than "about his person")
is a misdemeanor for a first offense;
(2) The minimum penalty of six months improsonment for the first is eliminated;
(3) The application procedure for obtaining such a license is simplified and some application
requirements are eliminated; and
(4) Exceptions to the prohibition of carrying dangerous weapons expanded to include the
carrying of such weapons between home and place of business and between home or place
of business and place of target practice.
S. 142, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1988).
122. Telephone interview with Senator Larry Tucker, (October 14, 1988).
22
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/7
STATE v. BUCKNER
deemed more important. 123 Therefore, the Legislature will most likely
act during an upcoming session to amend the dangerous weapon
provision in light of Buckner.
An analysis of Senate Bill No. 142 illustrates that the court could
find that bill constitutional under Buckner. Applying the balancing
test from Buckner, the state's interest in protecting the health, safety
and welfare of its citizens by prohibiting concealed carrying of weap-
ons is greater than the infringement upon the individual's consti-
tutional right to keep and bear arms. The purpose of prohibiting
concealed weapons is that of protecting the public by preventing an
individual from having readily available a weapon of which the pub-
lic is unaware, and which might be used by that individual in an
offensive rather than defensive manner. 124 Such concerns weigh heav-
ily against those individuals who desire to carry concealed weapons.
The constitutional provision only guarantees the right to bear arms
for defensive purposes, not the right to bear concealed arms. Senate
Bill No. 142 only regulates the manner in which an individual can
bear arms and permits an individual to keep and bear arms in an
open fashion for defensive purposes. By allowing an individual to
bear arms openly while prohibiting concealed carrying, the proposed
bill only slightly infringes upon the constitutional right. With such
a strong state interest balanced against a minor infringement upon
the constitutional right, prohibiting concealed weapons would pass
constitutional muster under the Buckner balancing test. And the
court in Buckner implicitly recognized that the state can regulate
the carrying of concealed handguns by noting that other states with
similar constitutional provisions have done so. 125 Also, the prohi-
123. Id.
124. Annotation, Offense of Carrying Concealed Weapon as Affected by Manner of Carrying
or Place of Concealment, 43 A.L.R.2d 492, 495.
125. Buckner at 19. Arizona prohibits concealed weapons and weapons within immediate control
of person in or on a means of transportation. Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102 (Supp. 1987). New
Hampshire prohibits loaded pistols in vehicle or concealed upon a person. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 159:4 (1977). Oregon prohibits concealed weapons and readily accessible weapons about the person
within any vehicle, but explicitly states firearms carried openly in belt holsters are not concealed within
the meaning of the statute. OR. REv. STAT. § 166.250 (1987). South Dakota, Utah, Washington and
Wyoming simply prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons. S.D. CODnEMD LAWS ANN. § 22-14-9
(1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-513 (Supp. 1988); VAsH. R v. CODE ANN. § 9.41.050 (1988); Wyo.
STAT. § 6-8-104 (1977, 1988).
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bition does not unnecessarily invade the realm of protection guar-
anteed by the "Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment,"
satisfying the Buckner court's caveat pertaining to such regulation.
26
Thus, by changing the dangerous or deadly weapon statute, as pro-
posed by Senate Bill No. 142, to require a license only when carrying
concealed weapons, the amended statute would probably be con-
stitutional in light of the constitutional amendment and the Buckner
decision.
V. CONCLUSION
Should the West Virginia Legislature choose to regulate weapons,
it must balance the duty of the state to protect the health, safety,
and welfare of its citizens against the individual's guaranteed right
to keep and bear arms. The state's long history of restrictive stat-
utory regulations must give way to the recently adopted constitu-
tional amendment, providing West Virginians with more freedom in
the keeping and bearing of arms. The Buckner decision placed the
state on a path of repeal and revision of statutory regulations in-
fringing upon the constitutionally guaranteed right. A fair reading
of Buckner implies a right to armed self-defense, with the parameters
of that right to be fixed by the Legislature through the valid exercise
of police power and through future judicial challenges. Constitu-
tional challenges to statutory regulations for violation of the "Right
to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment" are just beginning.
In trying to assess the parameters of the constitutional right to
keep and bear arms, it is important to appreciate the will of the
people. The "Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment" was ex-
tremely popular among legislators and, more importantly, among
the general population of West Virginia. Perhaps no other consti-
tutional amendment in the history of the state has received such
widespread support. Such support should not be surprising consid-
ering that West Virginia is a rural state, where hunting constitutes
126. The court warned that "a governmental purpose to control or prohibit certain activities,
which may be constitutionally subject to state regulation under the police power, may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the realm of protected freedoms,
such as the right to keep and bear arms guaranteed in our state constitution." Buckner, No. CC972
at 23 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 91
24
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/7
STATE v. BUCKNER
a portion of the lives of many people and firearms are considered
commonplace. The people want relaxed firearms provisions, and in
support of relaxed firearm regulations, authorities have reported no
increase in crime or in gun sales since the Buckner ruling. 2 7
Michael 0. Callaghan
127. Dominion Post, Sept. 23, 1988, at 5A, col. 1.
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